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Abstract 
Previous analyses of civil war trends tend to be informal and consider only post 1945 
data. We examine data on civil wars over the period 1816 to 2005, using new methods 
for evolutionary growth processes. We find a number of new patterns and trends in civil 
war that have received little attention in previous research, including a structural break 
in frequency of conflict with decolonialization, as well as evidence of periodicity in 
civil conflict. We develop new measures of civil war intensity and impact, and find that 
conflicts have been generally more severe in the 20th than in the 19th century. We also 
find that the frequency-severity distribution of civil war does not appear to follow a 
power-law distribution, unlike data on many other types of conflict. Although structural 
trends suggest an increase in future civil wars, we discuss possible limiting factors that 
might prevent this in light of the recent observed decline in civil wars after the Cold 
War. 
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Introduction 
Questions about trends in the frequency and severity of conflict, such as whether 
conflicts are becoming more common or more severe, have always been central to 
conflict research (see, e.g., Levy 1983; Richardson 1941; Wright 1965) . Such questions 
are best answered by systematic analyses of data. Whereas many scholars made very 
pessimistic forecasts about how the end of the Cold War would usher in a new era of 
increased instability and conflict (see, e.g., Mueller 1994 for a review), many 
subsequent empirical analyses actually show a recent decline in conflict, following an 
increase in the frequency of civil war in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War 
(Cederman et al. 2016; Goldstein 2002, 2011; Gurr 2002; Mack 2007; Pinker 2011). 
Although there are many analyses of trends in civil war and the potential factors that 
may account for these, most such studies examine only data after 1945 and typically 
rely on informal analysis of trends. In this article, we consider trends and patterns in 
civil wars over a much longer period – 1816 to 2005, using updated data from Gleditsch 
(2004) – and assess the time evolution of ongoing conflicts by year using a new multi-
logistic methodology for analyzing evolutionary growth processes proposed by Miranda 
(2010) and Miranda and Lima (2010). Our analyses suggest a number of patterns and 
trends that so far have received little attention in conflict research. We find a clear 
structural break in the frequency of civil war before and after the period of 
decolonialization in the early 1960s. Moreover, there is some evidence of periodicity in 
civil conflict. We propose two new measures of civil war severity, which we call 
conflict intensity, based on the rate of casualties of a conflict over time, and conflict 
impact, based on the share of population killed in civil wars. Our analysis indicates that 
civil wars in the 20th century have been generally more severe than in the 19th century. 
Unlike many other types of conflicts, we find that the frequency-severity distribution of 
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civil war does not appear to follow a power-law distribution, suggesting instead a 
mixture of qualitatively different classes of conflicts. Although structural trends indicate 
that we should see an increase in future civil wars, we discuss some possible limiting 
factors that might prevent this in light of the recent observed decline in civil wars after 
the Cold War.  
 
Descriptive Analysis of Trends in Civil War 
We start by inspecting the yearly distribution of the number of ongoing civil wars from 
1816 to 2005, using version 1.52 of Gleditsch’s (2004) Expanded War Data. Figure 1 
displays the count of number of ongoing civil wars up to 2005, with two smoothed 
versions of the data, based on five year and ten year moving averages of the original 
data. We note that the main characteristics of the original data are preserved in both 
smoothed figures.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 2 displays the corresponding accumulated number of conflicts. A 
preliminary analysis of figures 1 and 2 suggests the existence of two distinct regimes: a 
first regime between 1816 and the beginning of the 1960 decade, with an average 
number of 4.79 conflicts per year, and a second regime from 1960 to 2005, with a much 
higher average number of 16.42 conflicts per year. Figure 2 shows a marked change of 
inflection in the accumulated number of conflicts by 1960, sharply separating the two 
regimes. The two regimes will be referred to as ranges 1 and 2, respectively. The civil 
war frequency in range 2 is roughly three times that of range 1. We note that the 
inflection point in this figure seems to correspond to the period of decolonization, and 
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the emergence of new independent states that for various reasons may be more prone to 
conflict (see Sambanis 2002).  
Another prominent feature in Figure 1 is that the yearly number of ongoing 
conflicts evolves as a sequence of somewhat regular bursts of conflicts.  In fact, close 
inspection of Figure 1 indicates that the yearly number of ongoing conflicts peaks 
roughly around 1835, 1875, 1900, 1930, 1955, 1975, and 1995, or with an average of 26 
years between peaks. In the next section, we proceed from a descriptive analysis to a 
more formal assessment of the time evolution of civil war, using a new multi-logistic 
methodology for analyzing evolutionary growth processes. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Multi-logistic Modeling of Civil War Trends as an Evolutionary Growth Process  
In this section we consider the event time series of ongoing civil war as an evolutionary 
process to examine the existence of trends, using a new multi-logistic methodology for 
analyzing evolutionary growth processes, recently proposed by Miranda and Lima 
(2010) and further detailed by Miranda (2010). Logistic modeling has traditionally been 
used to analyze growth processes in natural systems, such as population growth. 
Miranda and Lima (2010) and Miranda (2010) show how this methodology can be 
extended to consider trends in growth processes involving complex mixes of social, 
economic, and technological processes such as innovations, and also present evidence 
that considering such features can improve forecasts. In the case of civil war, this 
analysis will allow us to examine more formally whether there are regular trends in the 
frequency of conflict as well as notable changes over time.  
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Before turning to the application to civil war data we first outline the general 
concepts of logistic modeling and the main aspects of the methodology since these are 
unlikely to be familiar to social scientists. In general, a typical evolutionary growth 
process described by some cumulative indicator evolves over time following an S-
shaped or sigmoid curve, as shown schematically in Figure 3. After reaching a 
maximum growth rate, somewhere along its evolutionary trajectory, it eventually 
saturates. The dynamics of such a process is determined by the way that it grows in its 
early stages and later declines, that is, it follows from the specific relationship between 
its amplitude and its growth rate, or growth frequency, at a given time. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
One of the most widely used functions to describe the evolution of S-shaped 
processes is the so-called Verhulst logistic function, which can be given as  
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Here f (t) denotes the time-dependent variable describing the time evolution of the 
system, K, normally referred to as the system carrying capacity, denotes the excursion 
towards saturation, tc is the inflection point of maximum rate of change of f and τ -1 is 
the growth rate parameter. The time derivative of Eq (1), namely, 
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gives the logistic pulse, depicted in Fig. 2 by the dotted curve, which describes the rate 
at which the logistic process evolves. The time interval around the center point in which 
the logistic pulse is within half of its maximum height is given by tc ± ∆t / 2, where ∆t is 
related to the parameter τ by ∆t = 3.526 τ . That is, ∆t is a measure of the logistic pulse 
time duration. 
The logistic function was originally proposed by Verhulst (1845) to model 
human population dynamics, but remained practically forgotten for almost seventy 
years. In the 1920s Pearl and Reed (1920) rediscovered the Verhulst logistic model, and 
it soon attracted the attention of several researchers who applied it to several problems 
other than human population dynamics, ranging from population ecology to social 
behavior, from the spread of epidemics to the modeling economic processes, as well as 
to technological forecasting and substitution.  
Many of these studies consider systems for which the use of a single logistic 
model suffices, namely systems where it is reasonable to assume a constant carrying 
capacity. However, this is not realistic in many natural and manmade processes. 
Bacterial growth, for instance, provides a good example of a multi-step growth process 
where the carrying capacity is subject to change. In many biological systems, carrying 
capacity may change as species can expand or shrink their niches. In manmade or 
human controlled systems such as energy production, transportation, communications, 
the carrying capacity at a given period is often limited by the available technology. 
Advances in scientific knowledge and technology introduce new products and social 
processes that ultimately alter the dynamics of a specific sector. For instance, coal has 
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gradually come to replace wood as a primary energy source, and has in turn been 
partially replaced by oil and gas. At each stage of the technological substitution process, 
the carrying capacity of an energy supply system changes with the emergence of new 
primary energy sources.  
 Miranda and Lima (2010) and Miranda (2010) discuss a new methodology to 
improve the multi-logistic analysis of evolutionary time series. Their main concern is 
how to deal with extended series, especially series corresponding to a sequence of 
manmade events involving a complex mix of social, economical, technological and 
political factors. The methodology has been used to evaluate possible periodic 
structures that can be attributed to interaction of such components as well as whether 
short-term forecasts can be improved by taking into account such features.  
Given the complexity of factors that may affect the evolution of a time series it 
is unlikely that the relative influence of components will be homogeneous over time. 
Each feature is likely to have its own characteristic evolution time, and some 
components may dominate over others during certain periods. Hence, we would rarely 
expect an entire process to be represented by a smooth single evolutionary logistic 
curve. As such, the analysis of extended time series calls for a multi-logistic description. 
The multi-logistic description of a given time series uses a series of either logistic 
functions, when dealing with a cumulative indicator, such as the stock of automobiles in 
a given country, or the derivatives of the logistic functions, the so-called logistic pulses, 
in the case of event frequency time series such as the number of conflicts per year. 
The data fitting procedure is another important aspect of the methodology. If a 
model provides a good approximation to the data, the estimated parameters of the model 
function can be considered an optimal summary of the time evolution of the series of 
interest. However, the results can also provide information beyond the characteristic 
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components of the series, for instance through the structure of the residuals of the fitted 
model. In general, the residuals will consist of random fluctuations or noise, reflecting 
unrelated components. In some systems, however, the residuals series display structured 
oscillatory behavior. This may reflect important relationships among components where 
the correlations can reveal important intrinsic properties of the system represented by 
the original time series. The residuals or deviations correspond to the influences of the 
events or processes that decisively drive the initiatives represented by the data set. If the 
pattern of the residuals for example can be described by a truncated harmonic sine 
series, its fundamental frequency will directly reflect actual system parameters, very 
much in the same sense as the fundamental frequency of a stretched string (like that of a 
piano) is entirely determined by the string’s length, the material density, and the tension 
at which it was originally stretched.  
Modeling complex evolutionary systems requires both finding a good model 
function fitting the data, describing the trend exhibited by the events themselves, as well 
as a thorough analysis of the resulting residuals. In the multi-logistic approach we 
model the trend of a given series of events either by a multi-logistic function or by 
multi-logistic pulses, whose model functions are written either as  
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in the case of events per unit time series. In eqs (3) and (4), the parameter Ai denotes the 
excursion towards saturation during the i-th growth sequence, in the case of cumulative 
events, or the yearly amplitude in the case of a time series of events frequency. The 
parameter tci is the inflection point of maximum rate of change of f  in the sequence i 
and τi -1 is its growth rate parameter.  
The parameter τ  in Eqs. (3) and (4) is usually associated with the time it takes 
for the process to reach saturation. This time, also referred to as the process duration, is 
defined as the time required for the system to complete 80% of its excursion, 
corresponding to the system evolving from 10% to 90% of the total excursion. It turns 
out that, for all practical purposes, this lapse of time is approximately equal to 4.39 
times the value of τ.  
For the residuals reconstruction we rely on the straightforward use of a truncated 
sinusoidal Fourier series, although other signal reconstruction techniques such as 
wavelets also could be used. Accordingly, the data-to-model residuals were 
reconstructed using a truncated sine series of the type 
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Here, An and fn represent the amplitude and the phase of the n-th harmonic and f0 
stands for the frequency of the fundamental mode.  
 
Civil War Trend Analysis  
After reviewing key aspects of the methodology, we now return to the specific 
application of this approach to civil wars. We analyze the time evolution of civil wars in 
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each regime using a ten year moving average smoothed time series. The results for 
regime 1 are shown in Figure 4, where the crosses represent the smoothed empirical 
data, and the solid line the results of the logistic pulse modeling as given by Eq (4). The 
number of ongoing conflicts in this period is best modeled by a five logistic pulses 
model, with amplitude Ai’s, center point ti’s, and time constant τi’s as given in Table 1. 
We find conflict peaks around 1836, 1873, 1902, 1928, and 1958. These peaks 
generally seem to reflect periods of upheaval in the number of independent states and 
disputes over specific governments. For example, the first peak reflects a number of 
civil wars over control of the government in Europe and Latin America, as well as 
various secessionist conflicts at the fringes of the Russian and Ottoman empires, while 
the last peak reflects a number of independence movements in colonies as well as 
Marxist insurgencies.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
For the second regime, we find that a two logistic pulses model as shown in Fig 
5 provides the best fit, with corresponding fitting parameter values listed in Table 2. 
The first peak is around 1972, with a broad time span, which may reflect both civil wars 
sustained by the Cold War as well as various separatist conflicts, whereas the 1993 peak 
to a large extent seems to be related to the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia. 
 
[Figure 5] 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Figure 6 summarizes the overall picture emerging from this analysis. The 
horizontal dotted lines represent the average number of conflicts per year in ranges 1 
and 2, respectively, while the solid line gives the number of conflicts obtained from the 
logistic modeling. From the peak positions listed in Tables 1 and 2, we find an average 
peak-to-peak time span of about 26.3 years, indicating that the world has experienced a 
peak in the number of conflicts every, say, 26 years. 
 
[Figure 6] 
 
This pattern and observed peaks lead almost inevitably to a forecasting exercise, 
and this in turn suggests another peak in the number of civil wars by around 2019 given 
the observed 1993 peak. We stress, however, that such a forecast is only valid if there 
are no structural breaks in the series or other factors limiting conflict do not apply. We 
will return to this issue later.  
 
Residuals Analyses of Civil Wars Trend 
We now investigate whether we can extract additional information from the data by an 
analysis of the residuals. The residuals are given by the difference between the data 
points and the model fitted values, so that a positive residual reflect observed data 
values higher than the model predictions and vice-versa. As we discussed previously, 
non-randomly distributed residuals may reflect interesting intrinsic properties of a 
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system. The residuals have been fitted by a truncated sum of sine harmonics, as given in 
Eq. (5). Table 3 summarizes the results for the fundamental and dominant modes as 
obtained from the fitting of the residuals. From the fundamental mode results, we find a 
time period of 27.8 and of 30.8 years for the periodic behavior of the residuals in ranges 
1 and 2, respectively. Figures 7 and 8 display the corresponding residuals reconstruction 
for ranges 1 and 2, respectively, while Figure 9 displays the amplitude of the 
fundamental and dominant modes for both ranges. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
[Figure 8 about here] 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
These results suggest that the residuals for annual civil war incidence are not 
random and that there exists some underlying oscillatory structure. As shown in Table 
3, the residuals for range 1, besides the fundamental period of 27.8 years, display 
dominant harmonics corresponding to periods of 13.9, 7.0,  and 9.3 years. The 
corresponding results for range 2, also shown in Table 3, indicate that the dominant 
period (namely. 7.7 years) is roughly half that of range 1 (13.9 yrs). Coincidently, the 
dominant period of about 13.9 years we have found for the residuals in range 1 is 
similar to the 13 years periodicity of worldwide terrorist attacks reported by Clauset et 
al. (2007) based upon an autocorrelation analysis of such events between 1968 and 
2006.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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We perform an autocorrelation analysis to further examine whether these 
residuals represent a sequence of random or auto-correlated events (see Box and Jenkins 
1970). The plot of the autocorrelation coefficients of the range 1 residuals as a function 
of varying time lags is shown in Figure 10. A similar autocorrelation behavior is also 
found for the residuals of the logistic modeling of range 2. If random, such 
autocorrelations should be near zero for any and all time-lag separations. If one or more 
of the autocorrelations are significantly different from zero the series may be non-
random. The plot in Figure 10 shows a sequence of positive and negative spikes. Such a 
pattern is typical for the autocorrelation plot of a sequence of events exhibiting a strong 
degree of periodicity.  
 
[Figure 10 about here] 
 
Based on this evidence of periodicity in the residual data, we use the residuals for an 
exercise aimed at forecasting the next peaks in the number of conflicts. As we 
emphasized previously, the trend analysis is related to the actual occurrence of the 
events represented by the empirical data while the residual or deviations from the trend 
are likely to reflect a complex blend of political, economical, social and technological 
components. By extrapolating the fitted curve up to 2035, a sequence of peaks is 
obtained at about 2006, 2010, 2014, followed by the ones marked in Figure 8 around, 
2017, 2023, and 2031.  
We note, however, that we find very large negative residuals in the last years in 
the data, indicating that the model predictions are higher than the observed number of 
conflicts. Although the most recent data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
suggest an increase in ongoing civil wars from 2013 to 2014 (see Petterson and 
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Wallensteen 2015: 537), the total number of conflict still remains below the expected ot 
Cold War levels. This deviation between predicted and observed values raises question 
about whether the end of Cold War may represent a new structural shift in the series, 
and whether the frequency of civil war may have fallen to a permanently lower level 
following the initial spike around 1993. Although we cannot examine whether there 
may be such structural shifts without additional actual data, our model based predictions 
provides a useful basis for a structural forecast of the expected frequency of conflict 
based on past trends to which the observed record can be compared. If we find that the 
number of conflicts in the post-Cold War remains lower than the expected level, we 
could then consider propositions on what may have decreased the actual number of 
conflict relative to the counterfactual structural prediction, including features such as 
political reform and democratization, or advances in conflict management or more 
effective international organizations (see Cederman et al. 2016; Gurr 2000; Golstein 
2011; Mack 2007; Pinker 2011).  
 
 
Civil War Severity 
So far we have been discussing the time evolution of the number of civil wars rather 
than the severity of these conflicts. The analysis of conflict severity is a multifaceted 
problem that can be analyzed from different viewpoints, but conflict “intensity” and 
“impact” are clearly among the most central components. The concept of war intensity 
was introduced in the 1940s through Richardson’s (1935, 1941, 1960) pioneering work, 
which proposed the number of casualties as a measure of war intensity. However, a 
plausible operationalization of the intensity of a given phenomenon depends not only on 
the total number of events but also on its rate. In other words, intensity is usually related 
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to the number of events per time units or exposed area. For instance, in the case of solar 
radiation incident on Earth, the intensity parameter might be taken as the amount of 
solar radiation power per square meter. An alternative way to look at civil war severity 
in terms of intensity may be given by the number of casualties per day.  
An analysis of war severity should go beyond describing trends as measured by 
the simple intensity parameter. Among the many features that may affect conflict 
severity, population size is likely to exert a particularly strong impact on the magnitude 
of a conflict, and the severity of a conflict relative to population is also an important 
aspect of a conflict’s relative impact (see Cirillo and Taleb 2015; Pinker 2011). 
Accordingly, we propose the relative number of casualties, or the number of casualties 
per hundred thousand inhabitants, as a measure of conflict impact.  
In this section we present an analysis of civil wars severity based the daily death 
toll, as a measure of civil war intensity, as well as the death toll per hundred thousand 
inhabitants as a measure of their impacts. We have information on duration and death 
for 291 out of the 373 conflicts in the Gleditsch (2004) data. For each conflict, we 
compute a conflict intensity indicator based on the average daily casualty indicator by 
dividing the total death toll by the total duration. We derive a conflict impact indicator 
by dividing the total civil war death toll by the population of the country at the 
beginning of the conflict, using population data from Maddison (2003).  
In Table 4 we present a summary of the main characteristics of the severity 
indicators for the major civil wars. In the case of the civil war intensity parameter we 
considered as major conflicts those where the intensity parameter exceeds 100 fatalities 
per day. From the original 291 events only 43 fall in this category. Regarding the impact 
parameter, we consider conflicts as major if the total death toll during the conflict is 
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equal or greater than 1% of the country’s population at the beginning of the conflict. 
Table 5 lists the ten most severe conflicts based on each indicator.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Of the 43 major conflicts as given by the intensity criterion, 24 or 55.8% are 
conflicts with durations of less than 100 days. These intense short lived conflicts might 
be classified as heavily one-sided conflicts or perhaps even massacres by the 
government of much weaker opponents. By contrast, only 3 or 12% of the major 
conflicts as defined by the impact parameter fall in this category. Another interesting 
aspect that emerges from Table 4 is the involvement of European countries. With 
regards to the intensity criterion, the number of European countries involved in major 
events is more than four times greater than in the case of the impact criterion. We see 
this as reflecting how many high intensity conflicts pertain to colonial independence 
movements or involvements in conflicts in former colonies, where the demographic 
impact is much greater in the (ex-) colonies than in the metropoles. Another salient 
point in Table 4 is how civil wars in the 20th century tend to be much more severe than 
19th century civil wars, irrespective of the indicator. This is also clear from Table 5, 
which shows that only two conflicts from the 19th century contribute to the top ten most 
severe conflicts (i.e., China versus Taipings 1860 for intensity and Mexicans vs. 
Yucatan Mayas 1847 in the case of the impact). 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
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We now turn to consider the time evolution of the major civil wars as described 
by these indicators as well as the distribution of the civil wars as a function of their 
intensity and impact parameters. Figures 11 and 12 display the time evolution of the 
major civil wars as defined by their intensities (namely, those with intensities greater 
than 100 fatalities per day) and their impact factors (that is, total death toll during the 
conflict duration equal or greater than 1% of the country’s population at the beginning 
of the conflict). Both figures clearly confirm that major civil wars during the 20th 
century have been more severe than civil wars in the 19th century. 
 
[Figure 11 about here] 
[Figure 12 about here] 
  
The civil wars distributions as a function of the severity indicators were 
constructed by counting the corresponding number of conflicts, for each value indicator, 
as discussed in the Appendix. We have used two approaches. First, since the values of 
both indicators vary typically by four orders of magnitude, we assembled the 
distributions using logarithmic binning. Second, we worked directly with the 
corresponding cumulative distribution functions, commonly denoted by P(X < x), and 
defined as the number of events having an indicator with values less than a given value 
x, divided by the total number of events. Its complementary distribution function, 
denoted as P(X ≥ x), is defined as the ratio of the number of events having the indicator 
with values greater or equal to x. This approach follows closely Clauset et al.’s (2007) 
analysis of the frequency of severe terrorist events. We provide a brief summary of the 
main characteristics of the distribution functions in the Appendix. 
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In Figure 13 we show the civil wars cumulative distribution function as a 
function of intensities. After successive trials in modeling this cumulative distribution 
using different functions, we found that a sum of four logistic functions provided the 
best fitting model. The solid line in this plot corresponds to the fitted predictions of this 
model, with the values of the fitting parameters given in Table 6. Figure 14, in turn, 
shows the complementary distribution function (open symbols) as a function of the war 
intensity indicator in logarithm scale, together with the corresponding model function 
as obtained from the above cumulative distribution function data fitting. Finally, Figure 
15 presents the resulting probability density function obtained by taking the derivative 
with respect to the variable x of the cumulative distribution function. We note that the 
first three peaks, at x equal to 0.46, 1.46, and 2.66, corresponding to daily death tolls of 
the order of 1.6, 4.3, and 14.3, respectively, are quite visible in Figure 15, whereas the 
fourth peak at x = 3.96 (daily death toll of the order of 52.5) is not evident in this plot. 
The reason for this is that this is the weakest and widest out of the four peaks.   
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
[Figure 13 about here] 
[Figure 14 about here] 
[Figure 15 about here] 
 
The results presented in Figs. 13-15 contain a number of interesting aspects. 
First, contrary to what Clauset et al. (2007) find in the case of the severity of terrorism, 
the complementary cumulative distribution function shown in Figure 14 does not follow 
a so-called power law. That is, P(X ≥ x) does not scale as x-α as seems to be the case for 
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terrorism severity as discussed by Clauset et al. (2007), or as found in the case of 
interstate wars by Cederman (2003) and Richardson (1941). One interpretation of power 
laws is that there are no qualitative differences between small, medium and large events, 
and that a common underlying mechanism can account for the range of the distribution 
of events. We refer to Clauset et al. (2007) for further discussion. However, the results 
in Figure 15 indicate that the severity of civil wars, in terms of the daily death toll, 
seems to fall into distinct categories or classes. The strongest and clearest peak in the 
civil war intensity distribution corresponds to conflicts with an average daily death toll 
of 4.5 deaths per day, whereas the second dominant and broader peak, encompassing the 
majority of conflicts, refers to events with an average intensity of about 14 fatalities per 
day. This suggests that there may be different mechanisms generating the two classes of 
conflicts in terms of their intensity. 
We have also applied similar methods to model the dependence of the civil wars 
distribution functions on the impact indicator. The results are shown graphically in 
Figures 16 and 17, and Table 6 lists the fitted parameter values. Figure 16 displays, on a 
bi-logarithmic scale, the complementary cumulative distribution function dependence 
on the civil wars impact indicators, while Figure 17 shows the corresponding 
probability density function. We now find that a three logistic function model provides 
the best fit. 
 
[Figure 16 about here] 
[Figure 17 about here] 
 
The results shown in Figure 16, as well as in Figures 13 and 14, suggest that the 
proposed indicators provide a consistent picture of civil war severities. Figures 16 and 
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17 indicate that, in terms of their impact classification, civil wars do not exhibit a power 
law behavior, but rather fall into distinct classes according to the strength of their 
impact parameters. This is very well illustrated in Figure 17, where the two dominant 
peaks correspond to 5.2 and 42.7 fatalities per hundred thousand inhabitants, 
respectively.  The distinct behavior of the civil wars severity distribution functions may 
be due to the different nature of the corresponding indicators. The impact parameter is 
by definition a relative quantity that can be compared across all conflicts, while the 
intensity parameter may reflect more specific dynamics of conflicts.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
We have presented a quantitative analysis of the time evolution of the civil wars 
between 1816 and 2005 and two new proposed measures of civil war severity. Our 
“coarse-grained” time evolution analysis, considering the number of conflicts per year, 
suggests seven phases over the time period considered. The analysis of the residuals 
derived from the yearly conflict distribution analysis offered a complementary “fine-
grained” view of the evolution processes. Subtracting the overall trend off the civil wars 
yearly frequency time series, the residuals appear to exhibit a clear wavelike behavior. 
Furthermore, this wavelike behavior is not dominated by a single mode cycle, but rather 
by two or more periodic modes that add up to produce the observed wavy behavior of 
the time-series trend residuals, suggesting a complex mix of social, religious, economic, 
political and technological components involved in conflicts to varying degrees.  
Table 7 consolidates the identified phases characterizing the trend of civil wars 
distribution summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Table 7 displays the central year of each 
phase, the average number of conflicts per year for each phase, the time lapse between 
 22 
the center year of consecutive phases (center year shift) and the difference between the 
average number of conflicts (conflict frequency shift) for the sequential phases. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Figure 18 displays the center year shifts and the war frequencies shifts between 
the sequential phases as listed in Table 7. The average time lag between these seven 
peaks is about 26.3 years. Nevertheless, there is some tendency for the phase 
separations to get closer, especially after 1960 (transitions 5 to 6 and 6 to 7). Combining 
this result with the information displayed in Figures 6, 11, and 12 reinforces the 
conclusion that the frequencies and severity of civil wars have increased over the 20th 
century, although it is possible that the post-Cold War decline on civil war may indicate 
that we have moved into a qualitatively new and more peaceful global context.  
 
[Figure 18 about here] 
 
It is natural to consider whether these phases in the frequency of civil war 
display any correspondence to other global trends or delineations of specific period. 
Maddison (1991), for example, identifies four phases in global capitalist development, 
1870–1913, 1913–1950, 1950–1973, and 1973 onwards, using conventional 
macroeconomic indicators such as the rate of output growth, output per capita, capital 
stock, export volume, plus the cyclical variations in output, exports, level of 
unemployment and rate of price increase. We note that the Maddison’s first or “liberal” 
phase (1870–1913) follows closely after the 1873.17 second civil war phase peak, while 
the end of his “golden phase” (1950–1973), culminating in the 1973 oil crisis, coincides 
with the sixth civil war phase peak. Maddison emphasizes primarily economic policy 
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stances such as the unemployment/price stability trade-off and the freedom of 
international trade of factor movements in distinguishing between the delineation of 
phases, and conflict and political trends that fuel conflict primarily enter the analysis as 
exogenous “shocks”. Our analyses suggest that the economic trends highlighted in 
Maddison’s phases as well as other features shaping global economic evolution, such as 
state formations in Europe around 1870 and global commodity prices in 1972-3, may 
also have an influence on civil war and the ideologies that may generate conflict. For 
example, economic change can promote the development of nationalist and separatist 
sentiments, and efforts to expand the reach of the state can generate tensions with 
groups that see themselves as distinct (see, e.g., Hechter 2001; Wimmer 2013). 
However, a more detailed analysis beyond the scope of this paper obviously will be 
necessary to examine the strength of the evidence for such relationships, but we see this 
as a very promising avenue for further research.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
  
The fine-grained analysis of the residuals of the civil wars trend suggests an 
oscillatory structure with fundamental mode periods of 27.8 and 30.8 years in ranges 1 
and 2 respectively, which is approximately of the order of a human generation (25 – 30 
years). This lends some support to the conjecture that the rhythm of population 
dynamics can have an influence on social, political, and economic factors (see Turchin 
2013, Turchin and Korotayev 2006; Turchin and Nefedov 2010).  A number of scholars 
have identified cycles in economic activities, including Juglar (1856), Mitchell (1913, 
1927), Kitchin (1923), Kondratiev (1922), Kuznets (1930), and Schumpeter (1939). The 
26 years period for cyclical peaks in civil wars resembles the so-called Kuznets (1930) 
economic cycle period, related to investments in social infrastructure, which Kuznets 
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found to have a characteristic period between 15 to 25 years. Modelski and Thompson 
(1996) suggest long political cycles of approximately 120 years, based on the leading 
global powers.  Many researchers have tried to relate such cycles to trends in conflict, 
including early contributions by Dewey (1951), Wright (1965) and Richardson (1960), 
although most of these analyses have focused on interstate as opposed to civil wars (see 
Levy 1983; Goldstein 1988). Although it may seem tempting to interpret our findings in 
light of such cyclical theories, we stress that evolution of civil wars is likely to reflect 
more than simple economic trends, including the effectiveness and quality of 
governance, ethnic or religious exclusion, as well as technology and natural resources.  
With regards to forecasting the future, the trend analysis and residuals 
reconstruction shown in Figure 8 predict an increase in civil war between 2020 and 
2030. This forecast corresponds to a time span of about 110 to 120 years since the last 
change in the major powers, following the emergence of the US as the world’s leading 
political and military power by the middle of the 1910s. This is consistent with 
Modelski and Thompson (1996) long cycle, suggesting that power transitions often are 
accompanied by severe conflicts. Likewise, our analysis of civil war intensity and the 
impact of civil wars indicate a clear tendency towards increasingly severity of the 
hostilities.  
However, just as Richardson (1960) famously presented his analysis of arms 
races as a description of “what people will do if they do not stop to think”, forecasts of 
the future based exclusively on past trends may be overly pessimistic. There are some 
signs that the number of civil wars have decreased since their peak immediately after 
the Cold War (Cederman et al. 2016; Goldstein 2002, 2011; Gurr 2000; Human Security 
Report 2005; Mack 2007; Pinker 2011). Although some have seen the relatively severe 
civil war in Syria as evidence that the trend towards a decline in conflict may be 
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reversing (see Petterson and Wallensteen 2015), the evidence for a new upturn in the 
number of civil wars is modest and remains far below the peak at the end of the Cold 
War. There are a number of global trends including democratization, political reform, 
and increased economic growth in developing countries that may decrease incentives to 
use violence as well as possible improvements in conflict management efforts that may 
have helped decrease the escalation of major conflicts (see Cederman et al. 2016; Gurr 
2002; Goldstein 2002, 2011; Gurr 2000; Mack 2007; Pinker 2011). Although the 
challenge of civil wars to humanity should not be understated, the projected increase in 
conflict frequency and severity is at least not inevitable.  
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Figure 1 
Civil Wars Time Evolution from 1816 to 2005 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Frequency of civil wars from 1816 to 2005 represented by the open circles, together with two 
smoothed versions given by the five (×) and ten (∗) years moving averages of the original data.  
 27 
Figure 2 
Time Evolution of the Accumulated Number of Conflicts from 1816 to 2005 
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: The evolution of the accumulated number of civil wars is represented by the open circles. We insert 
two linear regression lines for the periods 1816 to 1960 and 1960 to 2005 to emphasize the sharp 
transition between the two distinct regimes of the data trend.     
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Figure 3 
Characteristics of S-shaped Curves Describing Evolutionary Processes 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Schematic plot of a typical S-shaped curve, characterized by three parameters, namely, its 
excursion towards saturation, the point tc at which the curve inflection occurs, as one goes from the 
initial growth stage to the final saturation, and a characteristic growth time parameter that indicates how 
sharp its growth is. The dashed curve is the time derivative of the S-shaped curve, representing its growth 
rate, and exhibits a characteristic “bell” shape. 
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Figure 4 
Time Evolution of the Number of Civil Wars between 1816 and 1960 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Time evolution of the number of civil wars between 1818 and 1960 (range 1). The solid line 
represents the results of logistic modeling as described in the text. 
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Figure 5 
Evolution of the Number of Civil Wars between 1960 and 2005 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Evolution of the number of civil wars between 1960 and 2005 (range 2). The solid line represents 
the results of logistic modeling as described in the text. 
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Figure 6 
Consolidation of the Model Results for the Number of Conflicts, 1816 to 2005 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Combined view of the evolution of the number of civil wars in ranges 1 and 2. The horizontal 
dotted lines represent the average number of conflicts per year in each range. 
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Figure 7 
Reconstruction of the Residuals from the Modeling of the Number of Conflicts in 
Range 1 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Residuals from the five logistic pulses modeling of the time evolution of civil wars in range 1. The 
solid line represents the result of a truncated sine series reconstruction. 
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Figure 8 
Reconstruction of the Residuals from the Modeling of the Number of Conflicts in 
Range 2 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Residuals from the two logistic pulses modeling of the time evolution of civil wars in range 2. The 
solid line represents the result of a truncated sine series reconstruction. 
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Figure 9 
Magnitudes of the Harmonic Modes of the Residuals Reconstruction 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Magnitude distribution of the harmonic modes in the truncated sine series reconstruction of the 
residuals from the logistic modeling of the time evolution of the number of civil wars. The horizontal and 
vertical dashed columns refer to the residuals reconstruction in ranges 1 and 2, respectively. 
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Figure 10 
Autocorrelation Coefficients of the Residuals of Range 1 Modeling 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Autocorrelation coefficients for the residuals from the logistic modeling of the time evolution of the 
number of civil wars in range 1 (1818-1960). 
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Figure 11 
Time Evolution of Civil War Intensity 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Time distribution of the major civil wars intensities.  
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Figure 12 
Time Evolution of Civil War Impact 
_____________________________________________________________________
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Time distribution of the major civil wars impact parameters. 
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Figure 13 
Civil War Cumulative Distribution as a Function of the Intensity 
 
 
Note: Cumulative distribution of civil wars as a function of their intensities. The solid line represents the 
data fitting to the logistic model discussed in the text. 
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Figure 14 
Civil War Complementary Cumulative Distribution as a Function of the Intensity 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Complementary cumulative distribution of civil wars as a function of their intensities. The solid 
line represents the theoretical model function as obtained from the cumulative distribution data fitting. 
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Figure 15 
Civil War Probability Density as a Function of the Intensity 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Probability density function for the civil wars as a function of the logarithm of their intensities. 
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Figure 16 
Civil War Complementary Cumulative Distribution as a Function of its Impact 
Indicator 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Complementary cumulative distribution of civil wars as a function of their impacts. The solid line 
represents the theoretical model function as obtained from the cumulative distribution data fitting. 
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Figure 17 
Civil War Probability Density as a Function of the Impact Indicator 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Probability density function for the civil wars as a function of the logarithm of their impacts. 
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Figure 18 
Shifts of the Center Years and War Frequencies of the Different Phases of Civil 
Wars, 1816 to 2005 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Time interval between the center years and the war frequency shifts of the sequential civil wars 
phases as listed in Table 7. 
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Table 1 
Summary of the Logistic Modeling Parameters Shown in Figure 4 
 
Parameters i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 
Ai 40.51 48.54 25.53 38.97 43.65 
ti 1835.61 1873.17 1901.71 1928.42 1957.71 
τi 8.83 8.73 4.99 8.23 8.23 
Residual Sum of Squares: 11.801 Coefficient of determination, R2: 0.964 
Note: Values found for the parameters of the five logistic pulses describing range 1 of the civil war 
conflicts. 
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Table 2 
Summary of the Logistic Modeling Parameters Shown in Figure 5 
 
Parameters i = 1 i = 2 
Ai 31.39 71.35 
ti 1972.96 1993.64 
τi 9.82 5.84 
Residual Sum of Squares: 4.50 Coefficient of determination, R2: 0.995 
Note: Values found for the parameters of the two logistic pulses describing range 2 of the civil war 
conflicts. 
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Table 3 
Summary of the Dominant Mode Characteristics of the Residuals Reconstruction 
 
Note: Dominant mode periods as obtained from the truncated sine series reconstruction of the data fitting 
of the residuals. 
 Range 1 Range 2 
Fundamental period 
(yr ) 
27.8 30.8 
 
 
Dominant modes 
 
Mode Magnitude Period 
(yr) 
Mode Magnitude Period 
(yr) 
2 0.233 13.9 4 0.193 7.7 
4 0.080 7.0 5 0.0121 6.2 
3 0.063 9.3 7 0.097 4.4 
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Table 4 
Summary of the main Characteristics of the Severity Indicators of Major Civil 
Wars 
 
Geographic Region of Participating Countries Civil War Severity Indicators 
Intensity  
greater than 100  
Impact Factor  
greater than 1% 
Europe 13 3 
East Asia 9 1 
Middle East 5 2 
Africa 10 10 
North America 1 1 
Latin America 5 9 
Number of conflicts in 19th century 8 (19%) 4 (15%) 
Number of conflicts in 20th century 35 (81%) 22 (85%) 
Total number of conflicts 43 26 
Note: Main characteristics of the severity indicators for the major civil wars as defined in the text. 
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Table 5 
Top Ten Conflicts as Determined by the Severity Indicators 
 
ID Country Starting 
Year 
Intensity 
(deaths 
per day) 
ID Country Starting 
Year 
Impact 
(deaths per 105 
inhabitants) 
2150 Rwanda 1994 4854.37 2150 Rwanda 1994 7982.12 
1630 El Salvador 1932 2666.67 2120 Liberia 1992 7841.09 
1870 Pakistan 1971 1984.13 1945 Afghanistan 1978 6938.59 
2120 Liberia 1992 1948.05 2020 Sudan 1983 5976.74 
1885 Burundi 1972 1923.08 1925 Angola 1975 5875.96 
2050 Buruni 1988 1250.00 2105 Bosnia 1991 5619.24 
1255 China 1860 1196.19 1170 Mexico 1847 3971.41 
2060 Romania 1989 1014.00 2135 Burundi 1993 3550.51 
1715 Bolivia 1952 750.00 1655 Spain 1936 2645.30 
2045 DR Yemen 1986 750.00 1700 Colombia 1949 2578.43 
Note: List of the top ten conflicts as determined by the civil war intensity and impact parameters as 
defined in the text. 
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Table 6 
Summary of the Model Parameters for the Cumulative Distribution Functions 
 
 Intensity indicator (death per day) Impact indicator (deaths per 105 inhabitants) 
 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 
Ai 0.001 0.135 0.465 0.410 0.265 0.236 0.545 
xi 0.464 1.462 2.662 3.957 1.644 3.754 4.923 
δi 0.012 0.175 0.791 1.458 0.635 0.348 1.704 
R2 0.9993 0.9995 
Note: Values of the fitting parameters of the logistic modeling for the civil wars cumulative distribution 
functions.  
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Table 7 
Civil Wars Phase Characteristics 
Phas
e 
Center 
Year 
Conflict 
Frequenc
y 
(per year) 
Phase 
Transition 
Time Lapse 
between 
Center Years 
(yrs) 
Difference in the  
Conflict 
Frequency  
(per year) 
1 1835.6
1 
40.51 
   
2 1873.1
7 
48.54 
1 → 2 37.56 8.03 
3 1901.7
1 
25.53 
2 → 3 28.54 -23.01 
4 1928.4
2 
39.97 
3 → 4 26.71 14.44 
5 1957.7
1 
43.65 
4 → 5 29.29 3.68 
6 1972.9
6 
31.39 
5 → 6 15.25 -12.26 
7 1993.6
4 
71.35 
6 → 7 20.68 39.96 
Note: Main characteristics of the seven identified phases of the trend of the Civil Wars between 1816 and 
2005. 
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Table 8 
 Civil War Phases and World Economy Phases  
Civil War Phases 
(present study) 
World Economy Phases  
(Maddison, 1991) 
1 – 1835,61  
2 – 1873,17 
3 – 1901,71 
1870–1913 (liberal phase; center year at 1891.5) 
4 – 1928,42 1913–1950 (worldwide shock period; center year at 1931.5) 
5 – 1957,71 
6 – 1972,96 
1950–1973 (golden phase; center year at 1961.5) 
7 – 1993,64 1973 onwards 
Note: Main characteristics of the civil wars phases between 1816 and 2005 as identified in the present 
work and the world economy phases investigated by Maddison (1991).   
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APPENDIX:  Probability Density as a Function of the Severity Indicators 
 The civil wars distribution as a function of the severity indicators were constructed as 
by counting, for each value of the corresponding indicator, the number of conflicts. 
Since the values of both indicators vary typically four orders of magnitude, our 
distributions were assembled using a logarithmic binning for both indicators. In the 
Table below we present a summary of the data used in this study. Table 6 shows, for 
instance, that beginning with 1 conflict ln (Intensity) = -1.7 ± 0.1 we ended up with 1 
war having log (Intensity) = 8.4 ± 0.1 (i.e., between roughly 6,310 and 10,000 battle 
deaths per day). 
 
 
ln (Intensity) 
 
Intensity Probability 
Density Function 
 
ln (Impact) 
 
Impact Probability 
Density Function 
a 
-1.7 ± 0.1 0.023 -3.7 ± 0.1 0.017 
-1.4 ± 0.1 0.023 -1.7 ± 0.1 0.017 
-1.1 ± 0.1 0.023 -1.5 ± 0.1 0.034 
-0.8 ± 0.1  0.023 -1.3 ± 0.1 0.017 
-0.4 ± 0.1 0.070 -1.1 ± 0.1 0.034 
0 ± 0.1  0.023 -0.9 ± 0.1 0.017 
0.2 ± 0.1 0.023 -0.7 ± 0.1 0.017 
0.4 ± 0.1 0.164 -0.5 ± 0.1 0.034 
0.6 ± 0.1 0.047 -0.3 ± 0.1 0.017 
0.8 ± 0.1 0.023 0 ± 0.1  0.017 
1 ± 0.1  0.210 0.2 ± 0.1 0.069 
1.2 ± 0.1 0.210 0.4 ± 0.1 0.034 
1.4 ± 0.1 0.280 0.6 ± 0.1 0.034 
1.6 ± 0.1 0.374 0.8 ± 0.1 0.155 
1.8 ± 0.1 0.210 1 ± 0.1  0.223 
2 ± 0.1  0.164 1.2 ± 0.1 0.069 
2.2 ± 0.1 0.164 1.4 ± 0.1 0.086 
2.4 ± 0.1 0.234 1.6 ± 0.1 0.155 
2.6 ± 0.1 0.257 1.8 ± 0.1 0.137 
2.8 ± 0.1 0.187 2  ± 0.1  0.155 
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3 ± 0.1  0.164 2.2 ± 0.1 0.120 
3.2 ± 0.1 0.164 2.4 ± 0.1 0.137 
3.4 ± 0.1 0.257 2.6 ± 0.1 0.155 
3.6 ± 0.1 0.140 2.8 ± 0.1 0.103 
3.8 ± 0.1 0.164 3 ± 0.1   0.241 
4 ± 0.1   0.187 3.2 ± 0.1 0.155 
4.2 ± 0.1  0.117 3.4 ± 0.1 0.189 
4.4 ± 0.1 0.093 3.6 ± 0.1 0.223 
4.6 ± 0.1 0.093 3.8 ± 0.1 0.344 
4.8 ± 0.1 0.140 4 ± 0.1   0.206 
5 ± 0.1  0.117 4.2 ± 0.1 0.120 
5.2 ± 0.1  0.047 4.4 ± 0.1 0.189 
5.4 ± 0.1 0.070 4.6 ± 0.1 0.137 
5.6 ± 0.1  0.093 4.8 ± 0.1 0.086 
5.8 ± 0.1 0.047 5 ± 0.1   0.137 
6 ± 0.1  0.023 5.2 ± 0.1 0.155 
6.2 ± 0.1 0.023 5.4 ± 0.1 0.103 
6.4 ± 0.1 0.047 5.6 ± 0.1 0.034 
6.6 ± 0.1 0.093 5.8 ± 0.1 0.069 
7 ± 0.1  0.047 6 ± 0.1   0.017 
7.2 ± 0.1  0.023 6.2 ± 0.1 0.052 
7.6 ± 0.1 0.070 6.4 ± 0.1 0.120 
7.8 ± 0.1 0.023 6.6 ± 0.1 0.086 
8.4 ± 0.1 0.023 6.8 ± 0.1 0.034 
   7 ± 0.1   0.069 
  7.2 ± 0.1 0.086 
  7.4 ± 0.1 0.069 
  7.6 ± 0.1 0.034 
  7.8 ± 0.1 0.052 
  8.2 ± 0.1 0.034 
  8.6 ± 0.1 0.052 
  8.8 ± 0.1 0.017 
  9 ± 0.1   0.034 
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